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| A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF MASCULINIST EPISTEMOLOGY |
A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF MASCULINIST EPISTEMOLOGY
Scrutiny with a feminist eye has led to the development of a psychology that, for the first time, includes women's experiences and women's perspectives. The various prefeminist psychologies have spoken eloquently about how men socially construct and experience a unidimensional category named "woman," but have said little, if anything, about women's diverse experiences, about how women perceive themselves or others, about who women are, and especially about who and what women can be.
While many of these theorists and practitioners have simply assumed that what they knew about men and mankind extended to women, others have filled volumes discussing and analyzing the construct "woman," but have failed to explain how they developed that construct or to acknowledge that it ís a construct rather than an absolute reality, which would not need further explanation.
Epistemology is formally defined as the study of how knowledge is possible and how knowing is done (Bateson and Bateson 1987, p. 20). Prefeminist epistemologies were not only not objective or value-free but were based upon the world views and experiences of men, which appeared to them to be objective, evaluatively neutral, and universally applicable. Included among these so-called objective observations were men's experiences of women, along with a variety of androcentric psychological standards against which women were, and all too often still are, measured. Such biases could perhaps have been challenged sooner had the perspectives upon which they are based been explicitly acknowledged, that is, made visible. But the epistemology of a dominant group can be made to appear neutral, and its value base invisible, since it coincides perfectly with what appears to be society in some generic, universal form.
Justas many sensory experiences depend upon the perception of contrast-so that, for example, a visual image that is made to move in unison with the eye's scanning movement cannot be seen by that eye--masculinist epistemology in a patriarchal society may seem to define epistemology itself. A contrast had to develop first in the mind's eye of a few women, and then of many, before they could collectively make their perspectives visible. In this way, the feminist critique began.
Thus feminist psychology had, as its first task, to expose this masculinist epistemology and challenge its use as the foundation of traditional psychological thought. By masculinist epistemology, I mean systems of knowledge that take the masculine perspective unself-consciously, as if it were truly universal and objective. Despite claims to the contrary, masculinist epistemologies are built upon values that promote masculine needs and desires, making all others invisible. It is important to note that feminist thought sees its task not as promoting the needs and experiences of women as normative or universal but as making visible the varying experiences and perspectives that masculinist thought denies. Many examples of this distinction will be considered in this and subsequent chapters.
Scrutiny with a feminist eye has led to the development of a psychology that, for the first time, includes women's experiences and women's perspectives. The various prefeminist psychologies have spoken eloquently about how men socially construct and experience a unidimensional category named "woman," but have said little, if anything, about women's diverse experiences, about how women perceive themselves or others, about who women are, and especially about who and what women can be.
While many of these theorists and practitioners have simply assumed that what they knew about men and mankind extended to women, others have filled volumes discussing and analyzing the construct "woman," but have failed to explain how they developed that construct or to acknowledge that it ís a construct rather than an absolute reality, which would not need further explanation.
Epistemology is formally defined as the study of how knowledge is possible and how knowing is done (Bateson and Bateson 1987, p. 20). Prefeminist epistemologies were not only not objective or value-free but were based upon the world views and experiences of men, which appeared to them to be objective, evaluatively neutral, and universally applicable. Included among these so-called objective observations were men's experiences of women, along with a variety of androcentric psychological standards against which women were, and all too often still are, measured. Such biases could perhaps have been challenged sooner had the perspectives upon which they are based been explicitly acknowledged, that is, made visible. But the epistemology of a dominant group can be made to appear neutral, and its value base invisible, since it coincides perfectly with what appears to be society in some generic, universal form.
Justas many sensory experiences depend upon the perception of contrast-so that, for example, a visual image that is made to move in unison with the eye's scanning movement cannot be seen by that eye--masculinist epistemology in a patriarchal society may seem to define epistemology itself. A contrast had to develop first in the mind's eye of a few women, and then of many, before they could collectively make their perspectives visible. In this way, the feminist critique began.
Thus feminist psychology had, as its first task, to expose this masculinist epistemology and challenge its use as the foundation of traditional psychological thought. By masculinist epistemology, I mean systems of knowledge that take the masculine perspective unself-consciously, as if it were truly universal and objective. Despite claims to the contrary, masculinist epistemologies are built upon values that promote masculine needs and desires, making all others invisible. It is important to note that feminist thought sees its task not as promoting the needs and experiences of women as normative or universal but as making visible the varying experiences and perspectives that masculinist thought denies. Many examples of this distinction will be considered in this and subsequent chapters.
